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INTRODUCTION

Lateral movement by lawyers between law firms is now common
among partners, shareholders, and associates.' Indeed, lawyers may change
firms several times over the course of their careers. 2 Although lawyers are
sometimes forced to relocate, they routinely change firms voluntarily in
pursuit of compensation or opportunity. Ours is thus an age of lawyer mobility.3 It is also an age of client transience.4 While clients move from firm
to firm with lawyers who make lateral moves, they also shift relationships
*

Senior Vice President, Global Professions Practice, Aon Risk Services, Chi-

cago, Illinois. J.D., University of Kansas; M.Ed., University of Nebraska; B.S., Fort Hays
State University. Opinions expressed here are the author's alone.

1.
ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW AND ETHIcs OF
PARTNER WrrHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS § 1. 1, at 1:4 (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2007).

2.
Douglas R. Richmond, For a Few Dollars More: The Perplexing Problem of
UnethicalBilling Practicesby Lawyers, 60 S.C. L. REV. 63, 89 (2008).
3. Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second
Transformationof the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1893-94 (2008).
4.
See Steven A. Meyerowitz, Winning a 'Beauty Contest': Tips on Competingfor
a Client's Business, PA. LAW., July-Aug. 1998, at 18 ("The days are long gone when clients

stayed clients for life. In the case of corporate clients, those days are even longer gone.").

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 30

on their own. Some clients terminate relationships with law firms out of
discontent or dysfunction, 5 while others solicit new firms to represent them
through requests for proposals or so-called "beauty contests" despite seemingly satisfactory relationships with their existing lawyers. 6 Clients may
move their business in pursuit of lower hourly rates or firms willing to entertain alternative fee arrangements, and large organizational clients seeking
efficiency often reduce the number of law firms with which they work
through7 a consolidation process euphemistically referred to as "convergence.",
Understandably, lawyer and client mobility give rise to questions
about possible law firm property rights. For example, if a partner or shareholder leaves one firm to join another, does the first firm have a protectable
interest in client information that the departing lawyer might wish to have?
If so, on what basis? May associates who switch firms take along prototype
documents maintained by their former firms in form files or on their intranets, or documents they prepared while employed there, or may their former firms prevent them from doing so on the theory that those documents
are firm property? Even assuming that law firms must accept the costly
reality of lateral movement by junior lawyers, must they also acquiesce in
the associated transfer of their work product to potential competitors? If a
client severs its relationship with a firm and asks the firm to transfer its files
to new lawyers or to return them, may the law firm withhold materials constituting its work product? After all, the firm has an interest in its own intellectual capital or intellectual property, and it is further justified in not wishing to share that material or information with a competing firm. These are
not exotic issues or questions, but, as a practical matter, they are tremendously important ones. Unfortunately for courts and lawyers seeking related
guidance, case law squarely addressing these subjects is sparse.
Part II of this article examines law firms' ability to protect client lists
and data from use by departing lawyers, focusing on two bases for doing so:
trade secret law and fiduciary duty theory. With respect to the former, it
5.
See ALTMAN WEIL, INC., 2008 CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER SURVEY 5-6 (2008),
http://www.altmanweil.com/dirdocs/resource/64500722-1570-4d05-933a443fb ld5c7d2 document.pdf (indicating that nearly half of the chief legal officers surveyed
planned to fire at least one of their company's law firms, with the three leading causes of
dissatisfaction being mishandling of one or more critical matters, poor quality legal work,
and cost management).
6. See Kenneth D. Agran, The Treacherous Path to the Diamond-Studded Tiara:
Ethical Dilemmas in Legal Beauty Contests, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1307, 1308 (1996)
(explaining the legal beauty contest process and reasons for it).
7. See Hildebrandt International, Inc., Commoditizing Legal Service,
http://www.hildebrandt.com/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetail.aspx?PublicationGuid= If
d4e34a-a42a-4dOd-b4f6-0815dd66e443 (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (describing DuPont's
pioneering use of convergence).
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recommends steps for law firms to take in protecting their client lists and
data against misappropriation. Part III discusses firms' ability to protect
other information that they consider to be their intellectual capital or intellectual property. These materials include prototype documents maintained
in form files or on a firm's intranet and work product in client files. Finally,
Part IV addresses former clients' access to their files, including essential
aspects of lawyers' retaining liens, applicable rules of professional conduct,
judicial determinations of file "ownership" under majority and minority
approaches, cost allocation, and new issues raised in connection with electronic files.

II.

CLIENT INFORMATION AND LAWYER MOBILITY

Clients are the lifeblood of all law firms. The law recognizes the importance of firms' client relationships in the lawyer mobility context. For
example, partners who surreptitiously solicit their firms' clients before resigning to form or join a new law firm may be liable for breach of fiduciary
duty. The same is true for shareholders in firms organized as professional
corporations. 9 Associates owe fiduciary duties to their law firms and, accordingly, cannot do anything to compete with them for clients before leaving their employ.' 0 Departing lawyers who solicit their former firms' clients
either before or after their departure may in some cases be seen as tortiously
interfering with contractual relationships." Clearly, however, law firms do3
not own their clients.' 2 Clients belong to no lawyer; they are not property.'
They
are free to select their own lawyers and to change counsel as they see
14
fit.

8.
Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 816 N.E.2d 754, 761 (I11.App. Ct. 2004);
Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v. Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179, 1183-84 (N.Y.
1995).
9.
Wenzel v. Hopper & Galliher, P.C., 779 N.E.2d 30, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
10.
Kopka, Landau & Pinkus v. Hansen, 874 N.E.2d 1065, 1070 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007) (quoting Potts v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 475 N.E.2d 708, 712
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985)).
11.
See, e.g., Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 858-61 (Ohio
1999) (allowing tortious interference with contract claim against former associate and firm
that she joined); Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoffv. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 118186 (Pa. 1978) (holding that the law firm could sue departing associates for tortious interference with existing contractual relations).
12.
Kelly v. Smith, 611 N.E.2d 118, 122 (Ind. 1993); Phil Watson, P.C. v. Peterson,
650 N.W.2d 562, 565 n.l (Iowa 2002).
13.
Kelly, 611 N.E.2d at 122; Phil Watson, P.C., 650 N.W.2d at 565 n.1.
14.
See Watson v. Gibson Capital, L.L.C., 187 P.3d 735, 738 (Okla. 2008) ("Clients
possess unlimited power to discharge a lawyer."); Phillips v. Selig, 959 A.2d 420, 431 n.6
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) ("[T]he attorney-client relationship is terminable at the will of the
client, even when established in a written contract.").
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Although law firms cannot claim a proprietary interest in their clients,
firms do have an interest in their intellectual capital or intellectual property,
including client lists and data.' 5 This is potentially valuable information,
considering that lawyers' lateral movement is often fueled by supposedly
portable client relationships.' 6 If firms must accept the possibility of losing
lawyers to potential competitors, as is almost inevitably the case, they naturally want those departures to negatively affect as few client relationships
as possible. One way for firms to accomplish that goal is to prevent lawyers
from taking client lists and data with them if they leave to join another firm.
But on what theory or by what mechanism may such limitations be enforced? Contractual constraints seem an obvious choice, but firms' attempts
to contractually prevent lawyers from taking client information with them
in lateral moves are potentially vulnerable to challenge on anti-competitive
grounds 17 and as an impermissible restriction on clients' rights to freely
select their lawyers. 8 Even if they are ultimately unsuccessful, such challenges are potentially costly and disruptive. For present purposes, that
leaves as reasonable alternatives trade secret law and fiduciary duty theory,
A.

TRADE SECRETS AND LAW FIRM CLIENT INFORMATION

Not all confidential business information is considered a trade secret.' 9
Rather, a trade secret is information that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.2 °
To prevail on a trade secret claim, then, a plaintiff must establish that the
information sought to be protected was sufficiently secret to give it a com15.
Robert W. Hillman, The Property Wars of Law Firms: Of Client Lists, Trade
Secrets, and the FiduciaryDuties of Law Partners,30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 767, 768 (2003).
16.
Id. at 769.
17.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 5.6(a) (2008) (preventing lawyers
from offering or making "a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the
relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement").
18.
See Hillman, supra note 15, at 789 ("The difficulty with.., private ordering in
establishing rights to information concerning law firm clients is that the results of the bargaining may restrict use of client information in ways that may undermine the ability of
clients to freely select their law firms.").
19.
Id. at 771.
20.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005).
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petitive advantage, and that it affirmatively acted to prevent others from
acquiring or using the information. 2' Courts weighing trade secret allegations may further consider (1) the extent to which the information is known
outside the plaintiffs business, (2) the extent to which the information is
known by those inside the business, (3) the precautions taken by the plaintiff to guard the secrecy of the information, (4) the information's value to
the plaintiff and its competitors, (5) the effort or money expended by the
plaintiff in developing the information, and (6) the expense and time it
would take for others to properly acquire or duplicate the information. 2
Naturally, trade secret controversies depend on alleged misappropriation. In a nutshell, a person "misappropriates" trade secrets, by acquiring
them through "improper means," or by acquiring them under circumstances
giving rise to a duty to maintain their confidentiality or limit their use.23
"Improper means" supporting misappropriation allegations include "theft,
bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of duty to
24
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means."
Whether there has been a misappropriation generally presents a fact question.25
Client lists or other compilations of client data may constitute trade secrets in some circumstances. 26 The determination of whether they so qualify
depend on the facts of the particular case.27 Client lists or data compilations
may be entitled to protection even if the person accused of misappropriating
them memorized the information rather than taking hard or electronic copies .2
Initially, the argument that law firm client lists or data are protectable
trade secrets seems counter-intuitive. Law firms routinely identify representative clients on their websites and in legal directories. In litigation, firms'
clients are easily identified from court dockets, many of which are available
on-line and searchable by lawyer or law firm name. Legal magazines and
21.
Stenstrom Petroleum Servs. Group, Inc. v. Mesch, 874 N.E.2d 959, 974 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2007).
22.
See id.at 972; Al Minor & Assocs., Inc. v. Martin, 881 N.E.2d 850, 853 (Ohio
2008) (quoting State ex rel. The Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dep't of Ins., 687 N.E.2d 661, 672
(Ohio 1997)); In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 741-42 (Tex. 2003).
23.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005)
(defining "misappropriation" in full).
Id. § 1(1).
24.
25.
Microstrategy Inc. v. Li, 601 S.E.2d 580, 589 (Va. 2004).
26.
Vito v. Inman, 649 S.E.2d 753, 757 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
Liebert Corp. v. Mazur, 827 N.E.2d 909, 922 (I1. App. Ct. 2005); Iron Age
27.
Corp. v. Dvorak, 880 A.2d 657, 664 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
28.
Al Minor & Assocs., Inc. v. Martin, 881 N.E.2d 850, 853-55 (Ohio 2008)
(adopting the majority rule); Ed Nowogroski Ins., Inc. v. Rucker, 971 P.2d 936, 946-49
(Wash. 1999).
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newspapers publish lists identifying the law firms that serve America's
largest corporations. In many cities, it is common knowledge that particular
law firms regularly represent given clients in their corporate affairs. But
while the identity of law firm clients may be readily apparent or ascertainable and therefore beyond the scope of trade secret protection, client lists
and data are another matter. 29 For a lawyer who wishes to solicit a firm's
corporate clients, for example, it is the identities of the decision-makers
within the organization, the lines or types of legal work they control, and
their contact information that have economic value. Client information such
as fee structures, hourly billing rates, billing cycles, payment information,
and fee-realization rates are also valuable. It is just this sort of information
that may be found on firms' client lists or in their compilations of client
data.
1.

Cases and Controversies

Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden,30 decided by the Ohio Supreme
Court, is the leading law firm trade secrets case. There, Karen Bauernschmidt spent ten years as an associate at the Siegel firm representing clients in property valuation and real estate tax matters. She had access to all
of the firm's client files, as well as information concerning the identity of
Siegel's clients, including their addresses, contact persons, and fee agreements. 3 1 She also kept her own Rolodex directory of both personal and professional acquaintances. 32 Sometime in 1992, she began considering a lateral move to Arter & Hadden, then a prominent Cleveland law firm. She
discussed with Arter & Hadden the possibility of Siegel clients following
her to the firm and she explained to Arter & Hadden the nature of the contingent fee structure that Siegel generally used with clients for work like
that which Bauemschmidt expected to perform after relocating.33 Arter &
Hadden offered Bauernschmidt a job in late August 1992 and on September
2 she gave Siegel three-weeks' notice of her intent to make the move. Bauernschmidt continued practicing at Siegel for those three weeks and she
informed clients with whom she spoke during that period that other Siegel
lawyers would be assuming responsibility for their representations.3 4 She
told clients of her imminent move to Arter & Hadden only if they asked.35

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Hillman, supra note 15, at 774-75.
707 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio 1999).
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FredSiegel Co., 707 N.E.2d at 856.
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On September 22, 1992, the day before Bauernschmidt's departure,
Siegel instructed her in writing that she should not directly or indirectly
solicit any of its clients in the future, implying that it considered its client
list to be confidential. 36 Siegel also instructed her "not to 'take any lists or
copies of lists of the firms [sic] clients or any other listed information of the
firms [sic] business and any of the information in the firm's possession [sic]
dealing with said clients."' 37 Bauernschmidt left Siegel the next day, taking
her Rolodex with her. She
had a client list at home, which she returned to
38
Siegel upon its request.
Upon joining Arter & Hadden, Bauernschmidt wrote Siegel clients for
whom she had worked notifying them of her new law firm affiliation and
stating: "'I would like for us to continue our professional relationship.
When you need assistance or have questions, please contact me.' 39 She
identified these clients from various sources, possibly including both her
Rolodex and the Siegel client list. 40 Additionally, Arter & Hadden sent a
two-page mailing to its clients, various business owners, and prospective
clients identified from business directories, soliciting business for Bauernschmidt. 4 1 Bauernschmidt had no hand in creating the mailing list, but the
solicitation nonetheless reached Siegel clients. 42 Some Siegel clients requested that the firm transfer their files to Arter & Hadden.43 Peeved, Siegel
sued Bauernschmidt and Arter & Hadden on several theories, including
trade secret misappropriation." The trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendants. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
case for further proceedings on all counts except one for breach of fiduciary
duty, which it affirmed. 45 The defendants appealed to the Ohio Supreme
Court.
With respect to Siegel's misappropriation of trade secrets claim, the
defendants conceded the possibility that Bauernschmidt might have consulted Siegel's client list when identifying the clients for whom she had
worked. 46 Still, they argued, they were entitled to summary judgment because Siegel did not take adequate steps to protect the confidentiality of the
information in the client list.47 The supreme court disagreed, finding that
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 856-57 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Siegel's letter).
Id. at 857.
Id. (quoting Bauemschmidt's letter).
FredSiegel Co., 707 N.E.2d at 857.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FredSiegel Co., 707 N.E.2d at 858.
Id. at 861.
Id.
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there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Siegel took reasonable measures to protect the confidentiality of its client list.48 The court
based its finding on the following facts:
[T]he Siegel client list was maintained on a computer that
was protected by a password. Hard copies of the list were
stored within office filing cabinets, which were sometimes
locked. Fred Siegel testified during deposition that he
"probably" had told employees that the client list information 4was
confidential and not to be removed from the of9
fice.
Bauernschmidt and Arter & Hadden further contended that Spiegel's
client list was not a trade secret because all of the information it contained
was a matter of public record and capable of being independently assembled in a list.50 The court also rejected this argument, explaining:
The Siegel client list was sixty-three pages in length and
included the names of property owners, contact persons,
addresses, and telephone numbers of hundreds of clients.
The extensive accumulation of property owner names, contacts, addresses, and phone numbers contained in the Siegel
client list may well be shown at trial to represent the investment of Siegel time and effort over a long period.
The purpose of Ohio's trade secret law is to maintain
commercial ethics, encourage invention, and protect an
employer's investments and proprietary information. That
purpose would be frustrated were we to except from trade
secret status any knowledge or process based simply on the
fact that the information at issue was capable of being independently replicated. 5'
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that the
trial court erred by granting the defendants summary judgment on Siegel's
trade secret claim. 5 2 Affirming the court of appeals 53across the board, the
Fred Siegel court remanded the case to the trial court.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 862.
Id.
FredSiegel, 707 N.E.2d at 863.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.

2009]

YOURS, MINE, AND OURS

There are several questionable aspects of the Fred Siegel decision.
First, in evaluating Siegel's trade secret claim, the court of appeals distinguished between client information that Bauernschmidt took from Siegel's
client list and that which was on her Rolodex, and found that the latter was
not a trade secret.54 Yet, the court of appeals found that information about
clients Bauernschmidt served that was on the Siegel client list, but somehow was omitted from her Rolodex, was a trade secret. 55 Those conclusions
are irreconcilable. If information about clients (for whom Bauernschmidt
worked) was not a trade secret if in her Rolodex, then it was not a trade
secret if part of the Siegel client list, and she could fairly use the firm's client list to write her clients upon moving to Arter & Hadden.56 In short, in
affirming the court of appeals, the Fred Siegel court missed the distinction
between Siegel clients that Bauernschmidt represented while there and
those with whom she had no relationship.
Second, the supreme court curiously reasoned that Siegel clients Bauernschmidt worked for were not her clients, but were exclusively Siegel's
clients. 57 "Although her work as an employee of [Siegel] resulted in the
establishment of an attorney-client relationship with Siegel clients," the
court wrote, "Bauernschmidt had never entered into a contractual agreement with those clients under which she was personally obligated to provide legal services. '58 Of course, if Bauernschmidt had an attorney-client
relationship with Siegel clients, they were her clients; she owed them duties
of competence, confidentiality, diligence, and loyalty, and she could be
sued personally for malpractice or fiduciary breaches in their representations. The fact that clients for whom she worked were clients of the Siegel
firm did not mean that they were not also hers. It is plainly possible, after
all, for a client to have multiple lawyers in a single representation.
The Fred Siegel court's astonishing inability to recognize that Siegel
clients were also Bauernschmidt's clients had at least two consequences. As
noted above, it contributed to the court's failure to address the question of
whether information about clients constitutes a trade secret. Furthermore, it
positioned the court to largely overlook the interests of the clients themselves. 59 The court touched on the issue of client choice when analyzing
60
Siegel's claim that the defendants tortiously interfered with its contracts,
54.
Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, No. 71440, 1997 WL 428629, at *4 (Ohio
Ct. App. July 31, 1997), aff'd, 707 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio 1999).
55.
Id.
56.
FredSiegel Co., 707 N.E.2d at 863 (Cook, J., dissenting).
57.
Id.at 859 (majority opinion).
58.
Id.
59.
See Hillman, supra note 15, at 779 ("[W]hat is missing from the majority's
position is any consideration of the interests of clients.").
60.
FredSiegel Co., 707 N.E.2d at 860.
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but did not address it in any meaningful way, and did not return to the issue
in its trade secret analysis. Clients have a strong interest in the ability to
choose lawyers who, in their opinion, are best capable of representing
them.6 1 The Supreme Court of Ohio should have reconciled Siegel's interest
(in its supposedly confidential client list) with the clients' interests (in continued representation by Bauemschmidt). As a leading scholar has observed, "a withdrawing lawyer's use of otherwise protected information for
the purpose of informing clients the lawyer has represented of the lawyer's
change in firm affiliation may be appropriate in light of the fundamental
right of clients to choose their lawyers." 62 The clients who followed Bauernschmidt to Arter & Hadden apparently thought that she would represent
them more effectively than Siegel, since they moved with her despite receiving a preemptive letter from Siegel touting its capabilities and strong
desire to retain their business.63
Finally, the court likely would have been justified in affirming the trial
court judgment for the defendants based on Siegel's lukewarm efforts at
protecting its trade secrets. 64 While its computerized client list was password-protected, Siegel kept hard copies of its list in file cabinets that were
sometimes secured and sometimes not.65 The firm's name partner was
equivocal on informing employees about the firm's confidentiality stance,
testifying only that he "probably" did so. 66 There was no evidence that
Siegel had employees sign confidentiality agreements with respect to its
client lists, or that it stated its confidentiality policy in firm handbooks or
policy manuals. Perhaps most telling, Siegel slept (or at least napped) on its
claimed rights. Siegel learned of Bauernschmidt's impending move on September 2, 1992, yet it waited twenty days to inform her that it considered its
client list to be confidential.67 Although it is true that a party's efforts at
trade secret protection "are measured by a standard of 'reasonableness, not
perfection,"' 68 Siegel's protective steps as described in the opinion do not
appear to have been reasonable under the circumstances.
A Connecticut court departed substantially from the Fred Siegel
court's approach. The plaintiff in Early, Ludwick & Sweeney, LLC v.
61.
Eisenstein v. David G. Conlin, P.C., 827 N.E.2d 686, 690 (Mass. 2005).
62.
Hillman, supra note 15, at 779.
63.
See FredSiegel Co., 707 N.E.2d at 857 (concerning Siegel's letter to clients).
64. See Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Superior Court, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685, 694
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) ("A trade secret loses its protected status if the owner does not undertake reasonable efforts to keep it secret.").
65.
FredSiegel Co., 707 N.E.2d at 862.
66.
Id
67.
Id. at 856-57.
68.
Diomed, Inc. v. Vascular Solutions, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 137, 144 (D. Mass.
2006) (quoting TouchPoint Solutions, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 345 F. Supp. 2d 23, 30
(D. Mass. 2004)).
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Steele69 was a law firm specializing in pediatric lead poisoning cases on
behalf of plaintiffs. Steele was a lawyer at Early, Ludwick & Sweeney
(Early) from December 1991 to December 1997, when he left for Brown,
Welsh & Votre, P.C. (Brown).70 In January 1998, Steele wrote the parents
or guardians of sixteen minor clients of Early to inform them of his move to
Brown and, in most of those letters, expressed his willingness to continue
handling their cases. 71 Early sued Steele and Brown for misappropriating its
trade secrets and sought injunctive relief. 72 Early alleged that its clients'
names, addresses, telephone numbers, guardians, blood levels, and insurance coverage information constituted a client list, and thus a trade secret.73
The court disagreed.74
First, Early could not show that the information sought to be protected
bore a substantial element of secrecy.75 Twelve of the sixteen clients to
whom Steele wrote were in litigation, such that their names and claims
were public information.76 In addition, Early obtained many of its clients
through referrals by a non-profit advocacy group, Connecticut Citizen's
Action Group (CCAG), and there was no evidence that CCAG viewed any
of the information that Early claimed to be confidential in the same light, or
that it would not have provided that information to others upon inquiry.77
Second, Steele acquired Early's client list by proper means in the
course of his work.78 Having worked on the matters in question and having
established relationships with the subject clients, he was entitled to notify
them of his career move and his willingness to continue to represent them at
their option.79 Steele did not attempt to solicit any of the clients while still
an Early employee. 80 Finally on this point, Steele acquired experience and
expertise in pediatric lead poisoning cases while working for Early, and he
"was entitled to use those skills and knowledge" after leaving the firm. 81
Third, Early's efforts to safeguard its alleged trade secrets were inadequate. The firm did nothing more than take the usual precautions necessary
to ensure that client files remain confidential. 82 As the court correctly ob69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

No. CV 980409063 S, 1998 WL 516156 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 1998).
Id. at * 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Early, 1998 WL 516156, at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Early, 1998 WL 516156, at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id. Regrettably, the court did not describe those measures. See id.
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served,
"[n]ot all confidential information meets the definition of trade se,8 3
cret.

Fourth, the court considered the effect of Early's trade secret claim on
the strong public policy of allowing clients to choose the lawyers who will
represent them.8 4 This factor weighed against granting trade secret protection, as the court explained:
Were the court to grant [Early] the relief requested,
the clients' right to change counsel would be restricted.
This would clearly be contrary to public policy.
Were the plaintiff to prevail, a subclass of clients
would be created, who, because of the complexity or esoteric nature of their problems, were limited in their right to
change counsel. This, too, would be contrary to public policy.
...[I]t is highly unlikely that the clients in question,
in choosing [Early] to represent them, contemplated that
[Early] thus acquired a proprietary interest in their names,
addresses, telephone numbers, medical conditions and
blood lead levels such as to restrict said
clients' freedom to
85
change lawyers as the clients see fit.

The court concluded that Steele's conduct violated neither the Connecticut Uniform Trade Secrets Act nor the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act.86 It accordingly
denied Early any relief, and entered judgment for
87
Brown.
and
Steele
In Reeves v. Hanlon,88 Daniel Hanlon and Colin Greene were employed at the law firm of Reeves & Hanlon (Reeves), which specialized in
immigration law and litigation. They began secretly planning to start their
own law firm, also specializing in immigration law, to be called Hanlon &
Greene.89 For some five months while still employed at Reeves, they repeatedly gained access to Reeves' password-protected computer database to
print out confidential name, address, and telephone number information for
2200 clients. 9° After abruptly resigning from Reeves, they began soliciting
83.

Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
at *5.
Id.
at *5-6.
Id.
at *6.
Reeves v. Hanlon, 95 P.3d 513 (Cal. 2004).
Seeid. at 515.
Id.

84.

Early, 1998 WL 516156, at *4-5.
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Reeves' clients. 91 In some cases, they called clients to solicit them for their
new firm without informing the clients of their right to select counsel.92
Although Reeves normally had a very high rate of client retention, it "lost
144 clients to Hanlon & Greene over the next twelve months." 93 In response
to this and other dishonest competitive conduct, Reeves sued Hanlon,
Greene, and their new law firm on a variety of theories. 94 Reeves won a
$150,000 judgment plus costs at trial.95 That award was based partly on the
trial court's determination that the defendants violated the Uniform Trade
96
Secrets Act (UTSA) by misappropriating Reeves' confidential client list.
A lower appellate court affirmed the trial court judgment except for the
award of CoStS. 97 The defendants then sought review by the California Supreme Court.98
In analyzing Reeves' trade secret claim, the supreme court began by
noting that a client list may qualify as a trade secret, and that a party violates the UTSA by misappropriating a former employer's protected client
list by using it to solicit clients or otherwise obtain an unfair competitive
advantage. 99 The defendants conceded that Reeves' client list derived independent economic value from not being generally known, and that Reeves
took reasonable measures to protect its secrecy.' °° They argued, however,
that the trial court erred in finding that they violated the UTSA by mailing
professional announcements to clients on the list.' 0 ' Under California law,
the UTSA does not prohibit employees from announcing changes of employment to clients on protected client lists. 10 2 Merely announcing a new
business affiliation is not misappropriation because it is fundamental to a
person's right to fairly compete. 10 3
The Reeves court agreed that a party could announce a change of employment to clients on a confidential list and that doing so was not misap91.

Id. at 515-16.

92.
Id.
93.
Reeves, 95 P.3d at 516.
Id. The complaint alleged fourteen causes of action, with "intentional interfer94.
ence with contractual relationship, interference with prospective business opportunity, conspiracy to interfere with prospective economic advantage, misappropriation of confidential
information in violation of the USTA" being pertinent to this article. Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 522.
97. Id. at 516.
98.
Reeves, 95 P.3d at 516.
99.
Id. at 522 (citing Am. Credit Indem. Co. v. Sacks, 262 Cal. Rptr. 92 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989)).
100.
Id. at 522.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. (providing authority with three cases that follow California law).
103.
Reeves, 95 P.3d at 522 (quoting Am. Credit Indem. Co. v. Sacks, 262 Cal. Rptr.
92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)).
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propriation under the UTSA, but that was not what happened here.l°4 To the
contrary, there was substantial evidence that the defendants improperly
used Reeves' trade secrets to directly solicit clients for their pecuniary gain
and to Reeves' great detriment.' 0 5 Additionally, the defendants crafted the
announcement of their new firm in such a way that clients who received
it-many of whom spoke little English-believed that Reeves could no
longer represent them. 1°6 As a result, the defendants' conduct did not further their right to fairly compete 0for
business.'0 7 The supreme court thus
8
affirmed the judgment for Reeves.1
2.

Observations and Recommendations

Case law demonstrates that law firm client lists or client data compilations may qualify for trade secret protection on the right facts. Firms may
be able to prevent departing lawyers from taking client lists or data with
them in some instances. In considering this prospect, it is critically important to distinguish between clients whom departing lawyers represented
while at the firm and those they did not. Firms probably stand little chance
of protecting data concerning clients that departing lawyers represented,
whether individually or as part of a team. 10 9 Here the lawyers share an attorney-client relationship with the clients whose information they hope to
use and it is undeniable that an attorney-client relationship is a personal
one.°10 Clients' frequent allegiance to their lawyers, rather than to the firms
where those lawyers practice, undermines firms' trade secret claims in this
instance.' Moreover, in this context, clients' important right to counsel of
their choice outweighs firms' interest in their client information. Setting
1 12
aside the Ohio Supreme Court's questionable decision in Fred Siegel,
courts are unlikely to find that departing lawyers who take data for clients

104.
Id.
105. Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Id. at 522-23.
108.
Reeves, 95 P.3d at 523.
109.
See, e.g., Early, Ludwick & Sweeney, LLC v. Steele, No. CV 980409063S,
1998 WL 516156, at *1-3, 5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 1998) (denying trade secret protection).
110.
See HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 2.3.1.1, at 2:24 ("[T]he lawyer-client relationship
is personal in nature and dependent on the client's trust in the lawyer.").
111.
Hillman, supra note 15, at 776-77.
112.
Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853 (Ohio 1999).
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they represented are guilty of misappropriation." 3 That is probably the correct approach.
This conclusion is in step with trade secret law generally in at least
two respects. First, client lists reside at the periphery of trade secret protec' 5
tion, 114 "because they are developed in the normal course of business.""1
The same is true for the sort of client data discussed here. In any event,
allowing departing lawyers access to client lists or data relating to clients
they actually represented while at the firm is doctrinally inoffensive. Second, trade secret law inherently balances employers' and employees' rights
in competitive endeavors, with employers' rights to protect their trade secrets on one side of the scale and employees' rights to freely pursue their
livelihoods on the other." 6 Depriving departing lawyers of the use of client
information relating to clients they actually represented-and perhaps even
brought to their former firms-places undue weight on the firm side of the
scale. That seems especially true when coupled with clients' right to be
represented by counsel of their choice.
In contrast, courts should be willing to protect firms' client lists or client data compilations as trade secrets if the departing lawyers have no connection with the identified clients, save for their employment at the aggrieved law firm. In such cases the balance tips decidedly in firms' favor
because protecting the firm's information imposes no apparent restriction
on departing lawyers' freedom to pursue their livelihoods, let alone an unfair or unreasonable one. There is also no issue of client choice. It would be
quite a reach for a court to hold that clients had a paramount interest in representation by lawyers they never met or to whom they never spoke as
compared to the lawyers at the firm who actually served them. Besides,
departing lawyers can still attempt to persuade their former firms' other
clients to engage them instead and those clients are free to make that choice
even absent an existing professional bond-that relationship simply must
be forged without the advantageous use of the firms' trade secrets.
Beyond qualifying client lists or data as trade secrets in the sense of
deriving independent economic value from their confidentiality, the challenge for law firms is implementing measures to protect the secrecy of cliSee, e.g., Early, 1998 WL 516156, at *3 (finding that a lawyer who used client
113.
data to communicate with clients he represented while in former firm's employ did not misappropriate trade secrets).
Iron Age Corp. v. Dvorak, 2005 PA Super. 270, 12, 880 A.2d 657, 663 (Pa.
114.
Super. Ct. 2005) (citing Renee Beauty Salons, Inc. v. Blose-Venable, 652 A.2d 1345, 1347
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)).
115.
Id. (quoting Fidelity Fund, Inc. v. DiSanto, 500 A.2d 431, 436 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985)).
116.
Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 992 P.2d 175, 187 (Idaho 1999); Iron Age Corp., 880
A.2d at 663 (quoting Renee Beauty Salons, Inc. v. Blose-Venable, 652 A.2d 1345, 1347 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995)).
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ent lists or data. Remembering that "[o]nly reasonable efforts, not all conceivable efforts," 117 are needed to protect trade secrets, there are several
steps that firms may take to enhance their positions. First, to the extent
firms maintain client lists or data in electronic form, they should limit access through passwords" 8 or other safeguards. Hard copies should be kept
under lock or otherwise secured."l 9 Second, firms should include confidentiality policies in their attorney and staff handbooks or manuals, clearly
stating that client information is a trade secret and restricting its use. Third,
firms should consider requiring lawyers and staff to sign separate confidentiality agreements. Although not dispositive, confidentiality agreements are
clearly important to courts considering whether an organization took reasonable steps to maintain secrecy. 120 Fourth, all client lists or data should be
clearly identified as confidential. 121 Fifth, firms should limit access to client
lists and data.' 22 In the same vein, they should monitor the use of such information. There are legitimate reasons for lawyers or staff to use protected
client information, and a firm does not forfeit trade secret status by sharing
such information internally when appropriate.' 23 Still, prudent control is
important. Sixth, if firms suspect unauthorized use of client lists or data,
they should act expediently to protect their interests. Finally, when a firm
learns that lawyers are leaving, it should respectfully and timely reinforce
its confidentiality expectations with them-and what it considers their reciprocal obligations-to avoid possible misunderstandings and explore potential disagreements.

24

Of these measures, only the use of confidentiality agreements is
openly controversial. This is because Model Rule of Professional Conduct
5.6(a) generally makes it unethical for lawyers to contractually restrict other
125
lawyers' ability to practice law after termination of their relationship.

117.
Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 1987).
118.
Fred Siegel Co. v. Arter & Hadden, 707 N.E.2d 853, 862 (Ohio 1999).
119.
Zemco Mfg., Inc. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 759 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001) (citing Elm City Cheese Co. v. Frederico, 752 A.2d 1037, 1049 (Conn. 1999)).
120.
Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 4:00-CV-70CEJ, 2002 WL
32727076, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 2002).
121.
Zemco Mfg., Inc., 759 N.E.2d at 246 (citing Elm City Cheese Co., 752 A.2d at
1049).
122.
See Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1285 (Vt. 2001) (denying trade secret
protection where company did not secure customer list or restrict access to it in any fashion).
123.
Miller v. Hehlen, 104 P.3d 193, 202 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Enter. Leasing Co. of Phoenix v. Ehmke, 2 P.3d 1064, 1070 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)).
124.
See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. ConAgra, Inc., 79 S.W.3d 326, 333 (Ark. 2002) (faulting company for not conducting exit interview of employee as means of protecting trade
secrets).
125.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6(a) (2008).
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Agreements that violate Rule 5.6(a) are unenforceable. 2 6 But while Rule
5.6(a) recognizes that practice restrictions disserve lawyers by limiting their
autonomy, it is principally intended to protect clients. 127 Despite being
worded in terms of protecting lawyers' right to practice, Rule 5.6 is geared
toward ensuring clients' ability to engage their chosen counsel. 128 So long
as law firms' confidentiality agreements do not restrict departing lawyers'
ability to use client information for clients they represented while at the
firm, it is difficult to see how such agreements infringe on clients' freedom
to select counsel of their choice.
B.

FIDUCIARY DUTY THEORY

Apart from claiming possible trade secret protection, firms are most
likely to challenge departing lawyers' alleged misappropriation or misuse
of client lists and data on the theory that by doing so they have breached
their fiduciary duties. As a matter of partnership law, partners owe fiduciary
duties of good faith and loyalty to one another, 29 and to the partnership
itself. 3 ° Additionally, partners are agents of their firms, 131 and accordingly
owe fiduciary duties to their firms under agency law. 32 Shareholders in law
firms structured as professional corporations and limited liability companies
also owe their fellow shareholders and firms fiduciary duties. 133 Furthermore, lawyers' fiduciary duties to their firms do not depend on possession
of an equity interest in the firm. 34 Associates owe their law firms fiduciary
126.
See, e.g., Law Offices of Ronald J. Palagi, P.C. v. Howard, 747 N.W.2d 1, 1213 (Neb. 2008) (involving an agreement that created financial disincentive).
127.
Pierce v. Morrison Mahoney LLP, 897 N.E.2d 562, 568 (Mass. 2008).
128.
Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 146 (N.J. 1992).
129.
See Lach v. Man O'War, LLC, 256 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Ky. 2008); McCormick v.
Brevig, 169 P.3d 352, 362 (Mont. 2007); Jarl Invs., L.P. v. Fleck, 2007 PA Super. 358, 121,
937 A.2d 1113, 1123 (Pa. Super Ct. 2007) (quoting Clement v. Clement, 260 A.2d 728, 729
(Pa. 1970)); Moore v. Moore, 599 S.E.2d 467, 472 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
130.

See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(a) (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001).

131.

WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 285 (3d ed.

2001).
132.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
133.
Santalucia v. Sebright Transp., Inc., 232 F.3d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting
courts' willingness to extend "the familiar fiduciary duty principles of partnerships to professional corporations"); Fox v. Abrams, 210 Cal. Rptr. 260, 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that because lawyers are permitted to incorporate to achieve certain tax advantages
available to corporate employers, there is no reason to hold that when they practice together
in corporate form rather than partnership, they are relieved of fiduciary obligations toward
each other).
134.
See Burke v. Lakin Law Firm, PC, No. 07-cv-0076-MJR, 2008 WL 64521, at *4
(S.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 2008) (quoting Foodcomm Int'l v. Barry, 328 F.3d 300, 303 (7th Cir.

2003)).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNI!VERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 30

duties.'35 Even states which generally hold that mere employees do not owe
fiduciary duties to their employers impose fiduciary duties on associates
running to their firms based on associates' distinguishing status as law36
yers.
Lawyers' fiduciary duties to their fellow partners or shareholders and
law firms do not cease by virtue of the fact that the lawyers who owe them
are heading out the door. It is well settled that partners and shareholders
who solicit a firm's clients before resigning their positions breach their fiduciary duties, 137 as do associates who solicit their firms' clients before
resigning their employment. 138 In Gibbs v. Breed, Abbott & Morgan,139 a
New York court concluded that two partners breached fiduciary duties to
their former firm by supplying their new firm with confidential associate
salary and billing information well before informing their former partners
0
of their intention to leave.14
Despite the seeming clarity and compelling application of fiduciary
duty theory in this context, suing former colleagues for allegedly breaching
their fiduciary duties by misusing or misappropriating client information is
not necessarily a satisfying exercise. To be sure, suing for breach of fiduciary duty is in some instances simpler than pursuing a trade secret claim. For
example, departing lawyers breach their fiduciary duty of loyalty by surreptitiously acquiring a firm's confidential client list or data even if the list or
data do not qualify as trade secrets. '14 But actionable lines are not always
clearly drawn. Lawyers who are planning on leaving may make preparations to compete with their firms without breaching fiduciary duties, and it
is not always easy to distinguish between conduct
amounting to a fiduciary
42
breach and allowable pre-competitive activities.1
135.
Kopka, Landau & Pinkus v. Hansen, 874 N.E.2d 1065, 1070 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007); Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Potter, 844 A.2d 367, 382 (Md. 2004); Prince,
Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 94 P.3d 179, 184-85 (Utah 2004).
136. See, e.g., Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, 94 P.3d at 185 ("Because of the privilege granted to engage in the practice of law, we impose upon members of our bar a fiduciary duty that encompasses the obligation to not compete with their employer ... ").
137.
Vowell & Meelheim, P.C. v. Beddow, Erben & Bowen, P.A., 679 So. 2d 637,
639 (Ala. 1996) (involving a shareholder); Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 816 N.E.2d 754,
761 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (involving partners); Graubard Mollen Dannett & Horowitz v.
Moskovitz, 653 N.E.2d 1179, 1183 (N.Y. 1995) (referring to partners).
138.
In re Smith, 843 P.2d 449, 450-52 (Or. 1992) (holding that the associate's conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation violated a duty to his former firm).
139.
710 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
140. Id. at 581-84.
141.
See, e.g., Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 816 N.E.2d at 765-67 (finding that departing
lawyers breached fiduciary duties by having secretaries download confidential "service lists"
for firm's largest client).
142.
See Burke v. Lakin Law Firm, PC, No. 07-cv-0076-MJR, 2008 WL 64521, at *4
(S.D. I11.Jan. 3, 2008) (noting the difficulty of evaluating possible fiduciary breaches when

20091

YOURS, MINE, AND OURS

Distinctions are especially difficult to draw where the clients involved
were served by the departing lawyers while still with the firm. It may further be difficult in such cases for a firm to establish that departing lawyers'
alleged fiduciary breaches harmed the firm, thus defeating the cause of action. 143 Phil Watson, P.C. v. Peterson'" is an illustrative case. There, Peterson, an associate at Watson's firm, left to join a new firm. 145 In the two
months before his departure, he contacted a number of clients whom he
represented about transferring their files, and succeeded in taking thirty
cases to his new firm.146 Watson sued Peterson and his new firm on several
theories, including breach of fiduciary duty. 147 The Iowa Supreme Court
rejected that claim, however, based principally on a lack of identifiable
damages. 148 Even if a breach of fiduciary duty were established, the court
observed, Watson failed to show that Peterson's conduct1 "had
any effect on
49
it.'
accelerate
to
except
clients,
of
alignment
the ultimate
In Meehan v. Shaughnessy,' 50 Massachusetts' highest court held that
law firm partners alleged to have breached their fiduciary duties by improperly soliciting clients bear the burden of proving that the clients would have
accompanied them to their new firms in the absence of any breach.' 5 ' The
Meehan court reasoned that public policy supported its decision to shift the
burden of proof in such cases because it "encourages a defendant both to
preserve information concerning the circumstances of the plaintiff's injury
' 52
and to use best efforts to fulfill any duty he or she may owe the plaintiff."'
Circumstances relevant to whether a client freely chose to move with departing lawyers include (1) the identity of the lawyer responsible for attracting the client to the firm, (2) the identity of the lawyer who managed the
case or client relationship at the firm, (3) the client's sophistication and
lawyers leave law firms to set up competing practices); Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 693
N.E.2d 358, 364 (I11.1998) (agreeing with trial court that "it is difficult to locate the 'fence,'
or dividing line, between permissible and impermissible conduct in these circumstances" and
that "these boundaries cannot be drawn with mathematical precision"); Moskovitz, 653
N.E.2d at 1183-84 (noting difficulties and setting broad parameters for judging departing
lawyers' conduct).
143.
See HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 4.8.3.3, at 4:113 (discussing harm as element of
breach of fiduciary duty claim); see also Gibbs, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 584 (noting the difficulty of
calculating damages in fiduciary breach cases where departing lawyers use confidential firm
information).
144.
650 N.W.2d 562 (Iowa 2002).
145.
Id.at 562.
146.
Id.at 563.
147.
Id.
148.
Id.at 568-69.
149.
Phil Watson, P.C., 650 N.W.2d at 568.
150.
535 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1989).
151.
Id.at 1267.
152.
Id.
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knowledge, and (4) the departing lawyers' reputation and skill. 153 As a practical matter, though, departing lawyers forced to shoulder the burden of
proof on causation should have little trouble carrying it if they have per54 This is especially
sonal connections with the clients involved.1
true with
55
respect to sophisticated institutional clients.
C.

SUMMARY

Law firm client lists or client data may qualify for trade secret protection on the right facts. In considering this prospect, it is important to distinguish between clients who departing lawyers represented while at the firm
and those they did not. Firms probably stand little chance of protecting data
concerning clients that departing lawyers actually represented. On the other
hand, courts should protect as trade secrets firms' client lists or data compilations if the departing lawyers have no connection with the identified clients save for their employment at the law firm, assuming that firms can
demonstrate that their client lists or data qualify as trade secrets based on
their independent economic value and the measures taken to protect their
confidentiality. With respect to fiduciary duty theory, partners, shareholders, and associates alike owe their firms fiduciary duties of loyalty. Yet,
while departing lawyers breach their fiduciary duty of loyalty by surreptitiously acquiring a firm's confidential client list or data, even if the list or
data do not qualify as trade secrets, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish
between actionable misconduct and allowable pre-competitive planning.
Lines are especially difficult to draw where the clients involved were
served by the departing lawyers while still with the firm. It may further be
difficult for a firm to establish that departing lawyers' alleged fiduciary
breaches harmed it, thus defeating the cause of action.

III.

LAW FIRM DOCUMENTS AND FORMS

In addition to client lists and data, law firms commonly maintain other
documents, electronic files, and other information that they consider to be
their intellectual capital or intellectual property. These include prototype
documents maintained in hard copy form files or on a firm's intranet. In
litigation practices, these may include form interrogatories and requests for
production of documents, sample pleadings, prototype litigation hold letters, appellate briefs maintained in a "brief bank," deposition checklists,
expert witness engagement letters, and the like. In transactional practices,
153.
154.
155.

Id.at 1268.
HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 4.8.3.3, at 4:117.
Id.
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firms may maintain sample leases, incorporation papers, legal opinion letters, partnership and joint venture agreements, checklists for various types
of matters or transactions, and so on. In all firms, client files-both electronic and hard copy-hold abundant work product in the form of briefs,
pleadings and motions, research memoranda covering an array of topics,
deal documents used in all sorts of transactions, and so on. All such materials, no matter where maintained or stored and regardless of practice area,
embody the intellectual effort, strategic thought, and practical skill of the
firm's lawyers. They are quite often valuable
resources for lawyers under15 6
representations.
or
assignments
new
taking
Many firms give little thought to the value of the work product in their
files or on their information technology systems until someone, such as a
departing lawyer, wants copies. 15 7 By way of example, lawyers moving to
new firms may want to take copies of the deal documents for the various
transactions on which they worked. Associates changing firms may want to
take along form discovery documents, or pleadings or research memoranda
that they prepared. When departing lawyers ask for copies of documents or
electronic files to take with them, or it is apparent that they intend to make
copies for their continuing use, the parties involved may hold divergent
views on the acceptability of the departing lawyers' requests or actions.
From the law firm's perspective, its lawyers are bound to maintain the
confidentiality of documents prepared in connection with clients' representations. 158 Allowing departing lawyers to take copies of such documents is
inconsistent with the duty of confidentiality. Moreover, the documents constitute the firm's intellectual capital or property. While the departing lawyers may have prepared the documents in whole or part, they did so in the
firm's employ, on the firm's behalf, and in exchange for compensation
156.
Although not presently relevant, the types of materials described here are also
valuable to a firm's clients to the extent lawyers in the firm recycle existing documents for
use in new matters. This is because lawyers that are billing by the hour cannot ethically
charge clients the same amount for recycled work product that they charged the original
client. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379, at 221
(1993) (charging for recycled work must be evaluated not from the perspective of what a
client could be forced to pay, but rather from the perspective of what the lawyer actually
earned, and a lawyer "who is able to reuse old work product has not re-earned the hours
previously billed and compensated when the work product was first generated"). Absent a
contrary understanding, lawyers must pass along to clients the savings achieved by recycling
work product. Id.
157.
See D.C. Bar, Ethics Comm., Op. 273, at 3 (1997) (noting that departing lawyers often are interested in taking files and other documents).
158.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2008) (governing the ethical duty
of confidentiality); LAWRENCE J. Fox & SUSAN R. MARTYN, RED FLAGS: A LAWYER'S
HANDBOOK ON LEGAL ETHics § 5.01(a), at 87 (2005) (noting that lawyers' fiduciary duty of
confidentiality is rooted in agency law).
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from the firm. The documents exist solely because of the lawyers' affiliation with the firm.
From departing lawyers' perspective, any documents they had a hand
in preparing are their intellectual capital or property-not the firm's-since
those documents would not exist but for their efforts. Briefs or pleadings
filed in litigation, or transactional documents exchanged, are no longer the
firm's intellectual property by virtue of their possession by or accessibility
to others. This is especially true as to documents filed in litigation, which
are publicly accessible in court files and can often be searched, read, retrieved, and copied electronically. The same principle applies to documents
filed as exhibits to publicly-traded clients' SEC reports. As for who paid to
create the documents, it was the clients, not the firm. With respect to forms,
they have either been derived from documents used in client matters, or
have been used in countless representations with only slight modification.
Either way, there is nothing unique about them.
Gibbs v. Breed, Abbott & Morgan15 9 is a rare opinion bearing on this
subject, although not squarely so. In Gibbs, two trusts and estates partners
withdrawing from a New York law firm in a lateral move took along their
"chronology" or "desk files."' 160 These files contained copies of every letter
they wrote in the past two years. 16 ' Their former firm sued them for a variety of fiduciary breaches allegedly connected to their move, including the
removal of their desk files. Although the copies in the desk files were duplicates of those found in the firm's client files, the firm complained that
the chronological organization of the desk files made them a much easier
means of reviewing active client matters. 162 The trial court found that the
partners breached their fiduciary duties to the firm by removing their desk
files because doing so hobbled the firm's ability to reinvigorate its trust and
estates department and represent clients. 163 On appeal, the appellate court
affirmed that determination. A dissenting justice, however, reasoned that
while partners' fiduciary duties might prevent them from spiriting away
client files, those duties could not be expanded "to prohibit the removal, not
of client files belonging to the firm, but of duplicates of correspondence
' 64
and memos the partners themselves sent or issued."'
In Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Potter,165 an associate in a Maryland personal injury practice, Potter, left his allegedly unsavory employer, Weitzman, for a new firm. In doing so, Potter removed
159.

710 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).

165.

844 A.2d 367 (Md. 2004).

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 580-81.
Id. at 581 n.2.
Id.
Id. at 581.
Gibbs, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 591 (Saxe, J., concurring in part and dissenting inpart).
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three client files from Weitzman's firm. 66 The files belonged to clients that
he alone represented and he took two of them out of the reasonable concern
that Weitzman would improperly withhold the files, thus interfering with
his ability to represent the clients going forward. 167 The third file related to
a matter that was concluded before Potter left Weitzman's employ. 68 The
to his new
two clients whose matters were still active freely followed Potter
69
firm; neither one had ever had any dealings with Weitzman.1
When Weitzman could not negotiate a fee-sharing agreement with Potter, he filed an ethics complaint against him, 170 but the trial court cleared
Potter of all charges. 171 Bar Counsel appealed to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, where the court took a dim view of Potter's conduct. As the
court explained:
[Potter's] unauthorized removal of the client files violated
Rules 8.4(c) [prohibiting conduct involving dishonest,
fraud, deceit and misrepresentation] and (d) [prohibiting
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice]. At the
time [Potter] removed the client files, he did not have the
authorization of the law firm or the clients. Although [Potter's] belief that [the clients] would choose ultimately to
have him continue to provide legal services for them, they
did not give [him] permission to remove their files nor
could they have given him such permission while he was
employed with the firm. [Potter] acted dishonestly and in
an untrustworthy manner in exceeding the scope of his
authority, appropriating files, and deleting computer records.
It is important to note that we are not focusing on the
solicitation of clients by a departing associate or partner of
a law firm. The conduct in question ...

is the removal of

files by a lawyer without the knowledge of the law firm. It
appears that such conduct is 72uniformly condemned as
highly improper and unethical. 1
In judging Potter's conduct to be improper and unethical, the court
noted that associates owe fiduciary duties to their firms as a matter of
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.at 371-72.
Id. at 372.
Id.
Id.at 371.
Potter, 844 A.2d at 372-73.
Id.at 374-80.
Id. at 382.
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agency law, and that lawyers' unauthorized removal of client files is generally considered to be a breach of their fiduciary duties. 73 Potter's pure motives in taking the client files did not excuse his actions, but were only a
mitigating factor in deciding on the discipline to be imposed. 174 For taking
the client files and other misconduct, the court suspended Potter from prac75
tice for three months.
Gibbs and Potter suggest that departing lawyers who take materials
from their soon-to-be former firms without authorization do so at their peril.
Neither decision, however, is especially illuminating. Of the two, Potter
clearly has the least utility for departing lawyers attempting to formulate an
appropriate course of conduct because Potter's removal of original client
files in their entirety without the firm's authorization was so clearly improper. 76 Gibbs is arguably an outlier because of the nature of the documents at issue, i.e., copies of letters and memos to clients prepared by the
177
departing lawyers whose only value resided in the manner of their filing.
So what then are firms and lawyers supposed to do?
From a professional responsibility standpoint, departing lawyers may
generally take with them copies of documents that they prepared either for
78
clients or for general use in their practices without violating ethics rules.
Lawyers may also take copies of documents that they did not prepare if
those documents are in the public domain.' 79 Examples of such documents
include briefs and pleadings filed with courts or administrative agencies in
litigation, or documents of many types submitted to governmental entities
or officials in a variety of contexts.1 80 If lawyers retain copies of materials
prepared for clients, they must reasonably ensure the confidentiality of

173.
Id.
174.
See id at 388.
175.
Potter, 844 A.2d at 388.
176.
Id. at 382; see also Joseph D. Schein, P.C. v. Myers, 576 A.2d 985, 988-89 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990) (finding that law firm was entitled to damages for tortious interference with
contractual relationships where associates secretly removed client files as part of plan to
open competing law firm).
177.
Gibbs v. Breed, Abbott & Morgan, 710 N.Y.S.2d 578, 580-81 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) (describing the documents at issue).
178.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-414, at 8
(1999). The conclusion stated here may not be as clear as lawyers would like, because the
ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics & Professional Responsibility muddied the waters in
Formal Op. 99-414 when it wrote: "To the extent that ... documents were prepared by the
lawyer and are considered the lawyer's property or are in the public domain, she may take
copies with her." Id. (emphasis added). The obvious question is, considered the lawyer's
property by whom? The departing lawyer? The law firm? Formal Op. 99-414 does not answer these questions.
179.
Id. at 8.
180.

Id.
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those copies during and after their relocation.' 8' As for documents that departing lawyers did not have a hand in preparing or which are not publicwhich we will call "firm documents" for ease of reference-firm consent
may be required for copying. 82 Whether consent is required to copy firm
documents depends on the facts. If a firm has routinely allowed departing
lawyers to take copies of firm documents with no questions asked, for example, it is unreasonable to expect more recent 6migrds to seek permission
to do the same. On the other hand, if a firm has a policy against copying
firm documents for outside use, requiring departing lawyers to ask permission to take such copies with them is perfectly reasonable.
It is interesting to speculate about the disciplinary consequences of a
departing lawyer taking firm documents without permission. If a lawyer
takes firm documents contrary to a firm policy and does not lie about doing
so, misrepresent her intentions, or conceal her activities, what ethics rule
has she broken? Probably not Model Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits conduct
involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." 183 The lawyer in
this case has been disobedient, not dishonest. Another possibility is Model
Rule 8.4(d), which prohibits conduct "prejudicial to the administration of
184
and is intended to remedy violations of well-known practice
justice,"'
conventions and norms. 85 Unfortunately, Rule 8.4(d)'s potential application is unpredictable. Some courts interpret the rule broadly, invoking it to
discipline lawyers in atypical situations,18 6 for conduct that is somehow an
affront to the high professional standards that lawyers should be held to in
performing their public calling, 187 for conduct unbecoming officers of the
court,188 or for conduct that flagrantly violates professional norms and is
unquestionably serious. 89 These courts would seem inclined to apply Rule
8.4(d) in the situation posited here. Other courts, however, deem a lawyer's
alleged misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice only if it
181.
182.
183.

184.
185.

Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 8.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2008).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2008).

2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERWNG §

65.6, at 65-16 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2009).
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DzIENKOwSKI, LEGAL ETHIcs: THE LAWYER'S
186.

DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 8.4-2(e), at 1239 (2009).

See Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Mba-Jones, 919 A.2d 669, 676 (Md.
187.
2007) (quoting Rheb v. Bar Ass'n of Bait. City, 46 A.2d 289, 291 (Md. 1946)).
188.
In re Pyle, 156 P.3d 1231, 1247 (Kan. 2007) (discussing Rule 8.4(d)'s application outside of adjudicatory proceedings, stating that all lawyers are officers of the court, and
asserting that such status "brings with it the responsibility to refrain from conduct unbecom-

ing such officers").
In re Discipline of Att'y, 815 N.E.2d 1072, 1077-78 (Mass. 2004) (quoting In re
189.
Discipline of Two Att'ys, 660 N.E.2d 1093 (Mass. 1996)).
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relates to a judicial or similar proceeding.'9° In these jurisdictions, the conduct hypothesized here will not violate Rule 8.4(d). If the departing lawyer's conduct in taking the firm documents without permission can reasonably be characterized as stealing, then Model Rule 8.4(b), which makes
it professional misconduct for a lawyer to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects, ' 191 is in play. Notably, Rule 8.4(b) does not re92
quire a criminal complaint, prosecution, or conviction for a violation.
Furthermore, Rule 8.4(b) does not require a link between a lawyer's criminal act and legal services to clients for there to be a violation. 93
The calculus changes significantly if a departing lawyer lies about her
plans or attempts to conceal her activities. In such cases, Rule 8.4(c) almost
94
certainly applies.'
Rules of professional conduct are not the only potential constraints on
departing lawyers' ability to remove documents or information from firms.
There is always the fiduciary duty of loyalty imposed on lawyers as agents,
which arguably compels lawyers to obey the firm's policy on the duplication or retention of documents or information notwithstanding their imminent departure. Agents owe a duty of obedience as an aspect of their duty of
loyalty, and they are accordingly bound to follow their principals' lawful
instructions.1 95 Firm policies governing lawyer conduct are "instructions"
for agency purposes. Moreover, lawyers' fiduciary duties as agents probably compel them to seek the firm's permission to copy documents or files
even in the absence of a relevant policy.196 These principles apply, even if
the departing lawyers created the documents or other information that they
wish to take with them.
As a practical matter, some firms may not care whether departing lawyers retain copies of documents or materials that they prepared in whole or
part. There are many documents or files that probably matter little to firms
190.
See, e.g., In re Conduct of Lawrence, 98 P.3d 366, 375 (Or. 2004) (listing elements required to find that a lawyer engaged in conduct prejudicial to administration of
justice).
191.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2008).

192. Ligon v. Newman, 231 S.W.3d 662, 670 (Ark. 2006); In re Treinen, 131 P.3d
1282, 1283-84 (N.M. 2006); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 740 N.W.2d
125, 136 n.12 (Wis. 2007); ROTUNDA & DzrENKowsKI, supra note 186, § 8.4-2(c), at 1196.
193. Inglimo, 740 N.W.2d at 136-37.
194. Cf In re Cupples, 952 S.W.2d 226, 235 (Mo. 1997) (finding that lawyer who
secretly removed client files from firm violated Rule 8.4(c)).
195. See GREGORY, supranote 131, at 144 (discussing agents' duty of obedience).
196. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8.05(l)-(2) (2006) (stating
that an agent has a duty not to use a principal's confidential information or property for the
agent's own purposes); id.§ 8.05 cmt. b ("Termination of an agency relationship does not
end an agent's duties regarding property of the principal.").
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when lawyers leave, such as briefs or pleadings filed in courts, articles or
CLE materials written by the departing lawyers, etc. On the other hand,
there may be documents that departing lawyers prepared about which firms
care a great deal because (1) they perceive their work product to be qualitatively better than that of their competitors and (2) the documents are not in
the public domain. A firm might reasonably believe, for example, that its
standard ERISA plan documents are a cut above those of other firms in the
same city or region, and thus afford it a competitive advantage. Although in
many cases the departing lawyers will possess the knowledge to recreate
these documents, or at least to come close, it remains competitively advantageous for the firm to prevent duplication.
Law firms that are concerned about the protection of their intellectual
capital or property are wise to adopt policies aimed at protecting such materials against unauthorized duplication or removal. Clear policies reduce the
potential for confusion and enhance firms' ability to prevail in any property
dispute. For example, a firm might adopt a policy (either on a stand-alone
basis or within the scope of a broader policy) to the effect that all documents created by lawyers within the course and scope of their employment
by or partnership with the firm, whether existing or maintained in electronic
or paper form, are the property of either a client, the firm, or both. In the
case of a lawyer leaving the firm, the departing lawyer may not, without the
firm's prior permission, (a) copy any documents for purposes of removing
them from the firm upon the lawyer's departure, (b) remove original documents in connection with the lawyer's departure, (c) download documents
from the firm's systems into electronic media or storage mechanisms in
connection with the lawyer's departure, or (d) otherwise remove or transmit
any documents from the firm electronically or in any other fashion in connection with the lawyer's departure. The same prohibitions apply with respect to documents created or maintained by the firm that a lawyer leaving
the firm did not create or participate in creating.
Some lawyers may criticize this policy as sweeping too broadly and
casting departing lawyers as adversaries rather than as colleagues. This
policy or one like it may not be suitable for all firms. But assuming that a
firm is concerned about protecting its intellectual capital, the policy's
breadth is necessary to protect the firm in the unfortunate event of a dispute
and it is unhappily true that some lawyers become adversarial when making
career moves. What this policy does is (1) clearly set forth the firm's presumptive position and (2) allows the firm to make reasonable decisions
about the circulation or distribution of potentially valuable materials, rather
than having difficult choices forced on it in undesirable circumstances. A
firm should freely permit lawyers to copy non-client documents they prepared (e.g., articles, CLE materials, etc.) and documents such as filed pleadings that are in the public domain. Generally, and again consistent with this
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policy, firms should negotiate fairly with departing lawyers over materials
the lawyers wish to take with them.

IV.

CLIENT FILES

So far, our discussion of law firms' property rights has focused on departing lawyers' access to firm information or materials. In many controversies over the use or ownership of documents or materials held by law
firms, however, the claimant seeking possession is a former client. In the
typical case, the former client has discharged the firm for some reason and
requests that the firm deliver its file to a new law firm or return it. The firm
resists the request because it wishes to retain the entire file for economic
reasons, or, more commonly, portions of the file that it considers to be its
work product. These disputes may implicate a number of concerns.
A.

RETAINING LIENS

Disputes over client file ownership or possession are routinely attributable to unpaid legal fees. Most jurisdictions afford lawyers claiming a
right to compensation a "retaining lien," such that a law firm may refuse to
deliver to a client all papers or other property of the client in the firm's possession until the firm's fee has been fully paid. 197 The validity of a retaining
lien depends in the first instance on the client discharging the lawyer without cause. A lawyer who is discharged for cause may not assert a retaining
98
lien even if the engagement agreement for the matter provides for one.
What constitutes "cause" depends on the facts, but it clearly includes professional negligence. 99 Similarly, a lawyer who withdraws voluntarily from
a representation generally may not claim a retaining lien. 200 Beyond those
qualifications, for a retaining lien to be valid, the documents or items withheld must relate to the subject representation. 20 1 Because a retaining lien is
a possessory remedy, an attorney generally forfeits her lien by voluntarily
surrendering documents or property to which the lien attached.20 2

197.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GovERNING LAWYERS § 43 cmt. b (2007).
198.
Ulico Cas. Co. v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, 865 N.Y.S.2d
14, 23 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
199.
See, e.g., Gordon v. Siben & Siben, 558 N.Y.S.2d 439, 441-42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1990) (rejecting a retaining lien because plaintiff validly discharged law firm for professional negligence).
200.
HILLMAN, supra note 1, § 2.3.2.2, at 2:46.
201.
Schneider, Kleinick, Weitz, Damashek & Shoot v. City of N.Y., 754 N.Y.S.2d
220, 223 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
202.
Id.
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Lawyers' lien rights are not limitless; 203 indeed, some jurisdictions
permit lawyers to assert retaining liens only in very narrow circumstances. 20 4 A lawyer may be unable to hold onto a former client's documents where the client or a third party demonstrates a need for the documents. 0 5 A lawyer's retaining lien generally must yield to the lawyer's
"obligation not to prejudice a former client's ongoing suit by withholding
the client's file in order to collect unpaid fees." 2° 6 If a former client needs
its file to continue litigation and cannot pay or disputes the lawyer's fee, a
court may order the client to post suitable security so that the litigation may
proceed without impairing the attorney's lien rights. 207
B.

ETHICS RULES

Regardless of the reasons for lawyers' desire to withhold client files in
whole or part, their ability to do so may be constrained by rules of professional conduct. For example, Model Rule 1.15(d) provides in relevant part
that "[e]xcept as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by
agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client...
any ... property that the client ... is entitled to receive and, upon request
by the client ...shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such
property. 20 8 Model Rule 1.16(d) states that upon termination of a representation, "a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as . ..surrendering papers and property to
which the client is entitled ....The lawyer may retain papers relating to the
client to the extent permitted by other law., 20 9 A lawyer may violate either
rule by unreasonably delaying the return or transfer of a client's file, even if
it is ultimately surrendered. 210 Unfortunately, neither Rule 1.15(d) nor Rule
203.

Johnson v. Cherry, 422 F.3d 540, 555 (7th Cir. 2005).

210.

See, e.g., In re Arneja, 790 A.2d 552, 554-58 (D.C. 2002) (violating Rule

204.
See, e.g., D.C. Bar, Ethics Comm., Op. 273, at 3 (1997) ("[A] retaining lien may
be asserted against client files only in the narrowest of circumstances.").
205.
Johnson, 422 F.3d at 555.
206.
Mary A. Steams, P.C. v. Murphy, 587 S.E.2d 247, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); see
also Britton & Gray, P.C. v. Shelton, 69 P.3d 1210, 1215 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003) (determining that a lawyer's right to retain a client's documents must yield where the client will suffer
serious harm without them and that prejudice cannot be mitigated other than by returning the
documents).
207.
Michael J. Fingar, P.A. v. Braun & May Realty, Inc., 807 So. 2d 202, 203 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Bennett v. NSR, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 881, 883 (Ind.Ct. App. 1990).
208.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d) (2008).
209.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d) (2008).
1.16(d) by taking seven months to turn over a client's files); In re Morse, 470 S.E.2d 232,
232-33 (Ga. 1996) (suspending lawyer for failing to return client's papers for ten months);
Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wintroub, 745 N.W.2d 469, 475 (Iowa 2008)
(finding that lawyer's seven-month delay in returning file violated Iowa equivalent of Model
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1.16(d) provides lawyers with meaningful guidance concerning their duties
when ownership or possession of client files is at issue. Both rules say essentially that a client is entitled to those materials to which it is entitled.2
They are intended to protect clients' interests by imposing on lawyers a
duty to surrender clients' property without insisting on justification or support under property law, and in that way probably foreclose many disputes,
but neither one identifies documents or materials to which clients are entitled in the event of disagreements with their lawyers. Both rules do, how212
ever, permit lawyers to ethically assert ostensibly valid retaining liens.
On the other side of the coin, a lawyer may violate either rule by falsely
claiming a retaining lien,213 or by asserting a retaining lien in an effort to
collect an unreasonable fee.214
C.

FORMER CLIENTS' ACCESS TO LAWYERS' FILES

Courts have formulated two approaches to determining former clients'
access to their lawyers' files where there is no issue concerning unpaid legal fees or expenses. The first approach holds that unless a lawyer has a
claim for unpaid fees or expenses, "the client is presumed to be entitled to
full access to the attorney's file on a matter where the attorney represented
the client.,

215

This is the majority rule; 216 it is commonly called the "'entire

Rule 1.15(d)); Att'y Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Nichols, 950 A.2d 778, 783 (Md. 2008)
(violating Rule 1.16(d) by failing to forward client's file to counsel for six months).
211. See Corrigan v. Armstrong, Teasdale, Schlafly, Davis & Dicus, 824 S.W.2d 92,

97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (describing Rule 1.16 as a "tautology" for this reason).
212. See, e.g., Defendant A v. Idaho State Bar, 2 P.3d 147, 151-52 (Idaho 2000)
(holding that lawyer's assertion of retaining lien did not violate Rule 1.16(d)); Bennett, 553
N.E.2d at 884 (finding that retaining liens do not violate Rule 1.16(d)); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(d) (2008) (obligating lawyers to return clients' property
except as "otherwise permitted by law"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d)
(2008) ("The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other
law.").
See, e.g., In re Richmond's Case, 904 A.2d 684, 693-94 (N.H. 2006) (finding
213.
Rule 1.16(d) violation where lawyer baselessly asserted a retaining lien).
See, e.g., In re Struthers, 877 P.2d 789, 797-98 (Ariz. 1994) (finding a violation
214.
of Rule 1.16(d)).
215.
In re ANR Advance Transp. Co., 302 B.R. 607, 614 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2003).
216.
See Resolution Trust Corp. v. H----, P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647, 648-50 (N.D. Tex.
1989); ANR Advance Transp., 302 B.R. at 614 (citing Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose
Goetz & Mendelsohn L.L.P., 689 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1997)); Jones v. Cornm'r of Internal
Revenue, 129 T.C. 146, 154 (T.C. 2007); Eddy v. Fields, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 487, 490 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004); Putnam County v. Adams, 638 S.E.2d 404, 406 (Ga. 2006); Swift, Currie,
McGhee & Hiers v. Henry, 581 S.E.2d 37, 39-40 (Ga. 2003); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Gottschalk, 729 N.W.2d 812, 819-20 (Iowa 2007); Averill v. Cox, 761 A.2d
1083, 1092 (N.H. 2000); Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn L.L.P.,
689 N.E.2d 879, 881-82 (N.Y. 1997); see also Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Ethics Op.
2003-3 (2003) (adopting entire file approach); State Bar of Ariz., Comm. on Rules of Prof I
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file' approach., 217 Sage Realty Corp. v. ProskauerRose Goetz & Mendelsohn, L.L.P. 218 is clearly the leading case expressing the majority rule.
The plaintiff in Sage Realty retained the Proskauer firm to represent it
in a large mortgage financing with two entities known collectively as Nomura. Shortly after the transaction closed, Sage Realty lost faith in
Proskauer and replaced the firm on the Nomura matter with Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle LLP ("Nixon"). Sage Realty had paid Proskauer for
all its work on the Nomura matter by the time it engaged Nixon. When
asked by Nixon to turn over its files on the Nomura matter, Proskauer
largely complied, but withheld "a large number of ... internal legal memoranda, drafts of instruments, mark-ups, notes on contracts and transactions[,] and ownership structure charts. 219 Sage Realty also alleged that
Proskauer refused to turn over its correspondence with third parties and
certain notes on negotiations.2 2 °
Sage Realty sued to recover the papers withheld by Proskauer, asserting that they were necessary to its continued representation by Nixon. 221
While the Nomura transaction may have closed, there remained a number
of compliance and tax issues associated with the transaction with which the
company would require Nixon's legal guidance.222 Proskauer responded
that it had delivered all documents required for Nixon to effectively represent Sage Realty going forward.223 The trial court sided with Proskauer and
an intermediate appellate court affirmed, reasoning that the documents
withheld by Proskauer were its "private property," and need not be surrendered to Sage Realty absent a demonstration of "particularized need. 224

Conduct, Op. 98-07 (1998) (affording client access to entire file); Colo. Bar Ass'n, Ethics
Comm., Ethics Op. 104 (1999) (articulating majority rule); D.C. Bar, Legal Ethics Comm.,
Op. 333 (2005) (adopting entire-file approach); La. State Bar Ass'n, Rules of Prof I Conduct
Comm., Pub. Op. 05-RPCC-003, at 2-3 (2005) (taking entire file approach); Or. State Bar
Ass'n, Formal Op. No. 2005-125, at 332 (2005) (embracing entire file approach); Pa. Eth.
Op. 2007-100, 2007 WL 1170779, at *3 (Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof I
Resp. 2007) (adhering to the majority rule); Va. State Bar, Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics,
Op. No. 1366 (1990) (taking entire file approach); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 46(2) (2000) ("On request, a lawyer must allow a client or former
client to inspect and copy any document possessed by the lawyer relating to the representation, unless substantial grounds exist to refuse.").
217.
Gottschalk, 729 N.W.2d at 820.
218.
689 N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1997).
219.
Id. at 880.
220.
Id.
221.
Id.
222.
Id.
223.
Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 880.
224.
Id. at 881 (summarizing intermediate appellate court opinion).
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Sage Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York, which reversed
the lower courts.225
The Sage Realty court began by comparing the majority and minority
positions on client access to lawyers' files where there is no claim for unpaid legal fees. Under the majority approach, courts "presumptively accord
the client full access to the entire attorney's file on a represented matter
with narrow exceptions. 2 26 In contrast, the court noted, a minority of courts
distinguish between the "end product" of lawyers' services, to which clients
are entitled, and lawyers' "work product" leading to the creation of the end
product documents or materials, which remains the lawyers' property. 227
Following this approach, a client is entitled to the lawyer's work product
only to the extent it is necessary to understand the end product. 228 The client
bears the burden of proving its need for the lawyer's work product. 29
The court embraced the majority rule for several reasons. First, allowing a former client expansive access to a lawyer's file was consistent with
clients' rights to their files in pending matters. 23 In pending matters, New
York courts are unwilling to afford lawyers property rights in their files
superior to their clients'. 231 The Sage Realty court could "discern no principled basis upon which exclusive property rights to an attorney's work product in a client's file spring into being in favor of the attorney at the conclusion of a represented matter., 232 As this case also demonstrated, it is often
difficult to distinguish between closed matters and those that remain open,
thus suggesting a further need for clients' access to their lawyers' work
product.233

Second, the minority position unfairly and unrealistically assigns to
clients the burden of demonstrating their need for their lawyers' work product.234 As a rule, a client will be able to argue for its need for particular
documents only on the most general terms absent the disclosure of the contents of those very documents. 5 As a result, a client will often be unable to
carry its burden through no fault of its own. The lawyer who possesses the
file is in a far better position to demonstrate that a given document "would

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 882.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 882.
Id
Id.
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furnish
'' 3 no useful purpose in serving the client's present needs for legal advice.

Third, affording clients presumptive access to their lawyers' entire
files subject to narrow exceptions is consistent with lawyers' ethical and
fiduciary duties to clients. 237 As agents and fiduciaries, lawyers owe clients
duties of "openness and conscientious disclosure. 238 Lawyers' fiduciary
duties to their clients may continue after a representation concludes.239
Accordingly, the Sage Realty court concluded that the lower courts
erred in restricting Sage Realty's access to Proskauer's files. 24 Absent a
substantial showing of good cause by Proskauer to deny it access, Sage
Realty was permitted to inspect and copy Proskauer's work product for
which it paid. 241 The court did, however, carve out a substantial caveat,
stating that Proskauer was not required to surrender "documents which
might violate a duty of nondisclosure owed to a third party, or otherwise
imposed by law," nor "firm documents intended for internal law office review and use. 242 Documents in the latter category might include memoranda or notes containing lawyers' views of the client or preliminary assessments of key factual or legal issues "recorded primarily for the purpose
of giving internal direction to facilitate performance of the legal services
entailed in that representation," 243 as well as incomplete documents circulated exclusively within the firm. 244 Such documents may be withheld because they
are unlikely to be materially useful to a client or a successor law
24 5
firm.

Subsequent courts have embraced the Sage Realty court's approach
and reasoning. 24 Still, a few jurisdictions adhere to the minority rule,
known as the "end product" approach.247 The end product approach again

236.
Id.
237.
Id.at 882-83.
238.
Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 882.
239.
Id.
240.
Id. at 883.
Id.
241.
242.
Id.
243.
Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 883.
244.
In re Touch Am. Holdings, Inc., No. 03-11915 (KJC), 2009 WL 1393078, at *2
(Bankr. D. Del. May 14, 2009) (describing documents that might fall within the "internal
documents exception" to the entire file approach).
245.
Sage Realty Corp., 689 N.E.2d at 883.
246.
See, e.g., In re Touch Am. Holdings, Inc., 2009 WL 1393078, at *2; Iowa Supreme Court Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Gottschalk, 729 N.W.2d 812, 819-20 (Iowa 2007);
Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers v. Henry, 581 S.E.2d 37, 39-40 (Ga. 2003).
247.
See, e.g., In re ANR Advance Transp. Co., 302 B.R. 607, 614 n.l (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 2003) (interpreting Wisconsin law); Womack Newspapers, Inc. v. Town of Kitty
Hawk, 639 S.E.2d 96, 104 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007); I11.
State Bar Ass'n Advisory Op. on Prof'l
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assumes that there is no claim for unpaid legal fees or expenses. It distinguishes between the end product of lawyers' services to which clients are
entitled, and lawyers' "work product" leading to the creation of the end
product, to which they are not. Under the end product approach, clients are
entitled to receive copies of filed pleadings, final versions of documents
prepared in their representations, and their lawyers' correspondence with
them and with third parties, 248 as well as any other documents containing
information the client needs to protect his interests. 249 Lawyers' work product to which clients are not entitled under the end product approach includes firms' internal legal memoranda, and drafts of pleadings and legal
instruments. 225025
0 Lawyers' notes also fall into this category.25' Clients must
demonstrate substantial need to obtain copies of documents that are lawyers' work product 2
Given the substantial exception in the majority approach allowing
lawyers to withhold documents or materials prepared solely for their firms'
Conduct, Op. 94-13, 1995 WL 874715, *4-6 (1995); Kan. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Advisory

Comm., Op. 92-5 (1992).

Missouri law is confused on this subject. In Corrigan v. Armstrong, Teasdale,
Schlafly, Davis & Dicus, 824 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992), the Missouri Court of Appeals clearly embraced the end-product approach. Id. at 98. The confusion is attributable to
the Missouri Supreme Court's statement five years later in In re Cupples, 952 S.W.2d 226
(Mo. 1997), that a "client's files belong to the client, not to the attorney representing the
client. The client may direct an attorney or firm to transmit the file to newly retained counsel." Id. at 234. This language has caused some authorities to conclude that Missouri is an
entire file state. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Mo., Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 127 (2009)
(discussing the destruction of clients' paper files without clients' consent where lawyers
have electronic copies of the files). Critically, however, In re Cupples did not involve a
dispute between a client and a lawyer over the client's file. Rather, In re Cupples was a
dispute between a departing lawyer and his former firm over the departing lawyer's secret
removal of client files without the client's or the law firm's consent in an effort to continue
the client's representation upon establishing his own solo practice. In re Cupples, 952
S.W.2d at 229-30. By secretly removing the client's files from the established law firm of
the client's choice and attempting to relocate them to a nascent solo practice lacking similar
institutional systems and support, the lawyer materially altered the nature of the client's
representation and deprived the client of the opportunity to decide who would continue to
perform the client's legal work. Id. at 235. The case thus stands only for the entrenched
principle that clients belong to no lawyer; they are not property. Id. at 234. In re Cupples
should not be interpreted as endorsing or establishing the entire file rule in Missouri. The
Missouri Supreme Court has never overruled Corrigan, either expressly or by implication.
For these reasons, courts and lawyers are justified in treating Missouri as an end-product
jurisdiction.
248. ANR Advance Transp., 302 B.R. at 614.
249.
Corrigan,824 S.W.2d at 98.
250.
Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn L.L.P., 689 N.E.2d
879, 881-82 (N.Y. 1997).
251.
Womack Newspapers, Inc., 639 S.E.2d at 104.
252. ANR Advance Transp., 302 B.R. at 614.
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internal use or which might violate the lawyers' duty of confidentiality to
others, there may not be a substantial difference between the majority and
minority approaches.253 That said, the minority approach is flawed in at
least two respects. First, it unfairly shifts to the client the burden of establishing the true nature of the subject documents and the need for their surrender.254 Second, the end product rule cannot be reconciled with the gen255
eral principle that clients are entitled to all materials for which they pay.
As a Pennsylvania court explained:
Notes and memoranda are part of the package of goods and
services which a client purchases when they retain legal
counsel. The client is entitled to the full benefit of that for
which they pay. We therefore believe that once a client
pays for the creation of a legal document, and it is placed in
the client's file, it is the client, rather than the
attorney who
25 6
holds a proprietary interest in that document.
Indeed, even those courts that have adopted the minority approach seem to
acknowledge that it must yield where the client has paid the lawyer to create the documents sought to be withheld.257
Admittedly, the same observation can be made about the majority
rule-lawyers should not be able to withhold internal documents which the
clients were charged to prepare. 258 In the end, the only reasonable conclusion is that under both the majority and the minority approaches, clients are
entitled to copies of all documents for which they were charged to create
unless a firm has a duty or right to withhold them under ethics rules or other
253.
See, e.g., Lippe v. Baimco Corp., No. 96 CIV. 7600 DC, 1998 WL 901741, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1998) (following the entire-file approach and allowing a firm to withhold attorney notes, internal research memoranda and outlines, and a new matter memorandum and memo for checking conflicts of interest, but requiring firm to provide client with
copies of attorney time records).
254.
See ANR Advance Transp., 302 B.R. at 614 n.2 (observing that the principal
difference between the majority and minority approaches "is who bears the burden of showing the need for disclosure/secrecy").
255.
Maleski ex rel. Chronister v. Corp. Life Ins. Co., 641 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1994) (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. H----, P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647, 648-49 (N.D. Tex.
1989)).
256. Id.
257.
See, e.g., Womack Newspapers, Inc. v. Town of Kitty Hawk ex rel. Kitty Hawk
Town Council, 639 S.E.2d 96, 104 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that town owned documents in lawyers' file for which it paid); Corrigan v. Armstrong, Teasdale, Schlafly, Davis
& Dicus, 824 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) ("[T]he attorney must be required to turn
over to his client any documents for which the client has bargained and paid.").
258.
See Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn L.L.P., 689
N.E.2d 879, 883 (N.Y. 1997) (establishing this position as a general rule).
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law. 259 The best example of a document properly withheld here is one containing a litigation adversary's secret information produced in discovery
with the understanding that it is for the requesting lawyers' eyes only, and
will not be shared with their client. 260 Other law entitling firms to withhold
documents from clients plainly does not include the work product doctrine.261 Lawyers cannot invoke work product immunity to withhold the
fruits of their professional labors from clients. 262 Generally speaking, if law
firms want to withhold documents from clients, they should either not
charge for their preparation or be ready to refund the fees charged when
called upon to deliver the documents to the client. Alternatively, a firm and
client might contractually agree that the firm is not obligated to turn over all
documents within a file, but could instead withhold certain types or categories of material. Such an agreement could easily be detailed in an engagement letter.
Finally, five additional points merit passing attention. First, subject to
the law governing retaining liens in a particular jurisdiction, clients are generally entitled to the return of original documents and property they furnish
to their lawyers even if ownership of other file materials is legitimately
disputed.263 Second, lawyers may never withhold from clients or successor
counsel documents obtained or prepared at public expense. 264 This is most
259. See Sup. Ct. of Tex., Prof I Ethics Comm., Op. 570, 2006 WL 2038682, at *3
(2006) (listing as examples of information that might be withheld from a client "notes that
contain information obtained in discovery subject to a court's protective order forbidding
disclosure ... to the client, notes where the disclosure would violate the lawyer's duty to
another person, and notes containing information that could reasonably be expected to cause
serious harm to a mentally ill client"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 46 cmt. c (2000) (offering as examples of documents that might be withheld:
those shielded by a court's protective order, documents that a lawyer reasonably believes
might be used by the client to commit a crime, or documents containing another client's
confidences).
260. Pa. Eth. Op. 2007-100, 2007 WL 1170779, at *3 (Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Legal Ethics & Prof I Resp. 2007).
261.
M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., No. 91-CV-74110-DT, 2008 WL
3066143, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 2008) (quoting Martin v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz.,
140 F.R.D. 291, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)); Clark v. Milam, 847 F. Supp. 424, 426-27 (S.D. W.
Va. 1994); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 143 F.R.D. 241, 247 (D. Colo. 1992); Martin v. Valley Nat'l
Bank of Ariz., 140 F.R.D. 291, 320-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Resolution Trust Corp. v. H----,
P.C., 128 F.R.D. 647, 649 (N.D. Tex. 1989); In re ANR Advance Transp. Co., 302 B.R. 607,
615-20 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2003); Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers v. Henry, 581 S.E.2d 37,
40 (Ga. 2003); Ashcraft & Gerel v. Shaw, 728 A.2d 798, 814-16 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999);
Maleski, 641 A.2d at 5.
262.
Martin, 140 F.R.D. at 320.
263. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 46(3) cmt. c
(2000) (qualifying this duty).
264. See, e.g., In re Rosado, 1 So. 3d 1147, 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting
Potts v. State, 869 So. 2d 1223, 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
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often an issue in appointed cases. Third, in unusual cases, there may be
categories of clients that are not necessarily entitled to copies of lawyers'
files. In Wyly v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Shulman, LLP,265 for example,
New York's highest court held that absent class members are entitled to
class counsel's files upon conclusion of a matter only if they have a substantial financial interest in the class action's outcome and they can demonstrate a legitimate need for the requested documents. 266 Fourth, the fact that
a lawyer provides a client with copies of materials over the course of a representation does not eliminate the lawyer's duty to provide those documents
again when transferring a file. A lawyer cannot withhold documents to
which a client is entitled on the basis that they are duplicates.2 67 Fifth, at
least one court has concluded that in the context of a dispute over file ownership, a law firm's bills or invoices are its property and not clients' property.268 The fact that a law firm places copies of bills in clients' files does
not transform the bills into the clients' property. 269 Thus, a firm may2 70
decline
to furnish copies of its bills when delivering a file to a former client.
The idea that a firm can withhold copies of its bills on the basis that
they are not clients' property makes no sense. Bills are communications to a
client about a lawyer's services; 271 in fact, they may be the most regular

form of communication clients have with their lawyers. If lawyers can
withhold their bills when returning or transferring files, then they can presumably withhold other client communications, such as correspondence.
That is clearly not the case, of course, and no court would dare dream of
recognizing that approach. Furthermore, implied in every contract between
a lawyer and a client is "the client's right to know what the attorney did or
does, and how much time he took to do it."' 272 Clients pay for the activities
reflected on bills. They have a right to judge the reasonableness of their fees
even after a representation concludes; exercising that right requires access
to their bills. In addition, allowing lawyers to withhold their bills when returning or transferring files also ignores the rule that lawyers cannot with265.
908 N.E.2d 888 (N.Y. 2009).
266.
Id.at 907.
267.
Travis v. Supreme Court Comm. on Prof I Conduct, No. CPC-2008-004,
2009 WL 962688 (Ark. Apr. 9, 2009); see, e.g., Lake County Bar Ass'n v. Kubyn, 903
N.E.2d 1215, 1216-17 (Ohio 2009) (reprimanding a lawyer who declined to turn over former
client's file to a new lawyer because he had given former client copies of documents during
the representation).
268.
Saroff v. Cohen, No. E2008-00612-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 482498, at *7
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2009) (citing Ryan v. Surprise, 2003 WL 22071005 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Aug. 27, 2003)).
269.
Id.
270.
Id. at *7-8.
271.
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Leigh, 914 P.2d 661, 666 (Okla. 1996).
272.
In re Marriage of Pitulla, 491 N.E.2d 90, 94 (I11.
App. Ct. 1986).
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hold documents to which clients are entitled because they are duplicates.
Finally, unlike purely internal documents that firms may legitimately withhold even in entire file jurisdictions, bills are unquestionably intended for
delivery to clients. Bills are simply not internal documents. The fact that
lawyers prepare bills for their own benefit does not affect this analysis. For
example, lawyers correspond with clients to satisfy their ethical duty of
communication, 273 yet lawyers' self-interest does not then justify withholding copies of their letters when clients request their files. In summary, there
is ample reason to believe that many courts will not allow lawyers to withhold copies of their bills when returning or transferring files. That is unquestionably the better approach.
D.

COST ALLOCATION

Cost is a common concern when a lawyer is requested to deliver a file
to a former client or to the client's new lawyer. A lawyer may have to pay
to retrieve a file from storage, assembling or organizing a file may require
appreciable staff time, a file may need to be commercially delivered or
shipped, copying costs may be incurred, and so on. Lawyers may need or
want to keep copies of file documents for a variety of good reasons, including the protection of their own interests in the event of a malpractice claim,
or to satisfy rules or regulations requiring the maintenance of certain records.274 As a general rule, lawyers who wish to retain copies of client file
2 77 do
documents
for276their
may
so at may
their not
expense,
even iffora
client
objects.
Withown
rarepurposes
exception,
lawyers
charge275 clients

273. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2008) (establishing lawyers'
duty of communication).
274.

See, e.g., Moore v. Ackerman, 876 N.Y.S.2d 831, 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009)

(noting lawyers' obligation to maintain "bookkeeping records" and files in certain types of
cases, and thus allowing lawyers to charge clients for copies kept to satisfy recordkeeping
requirement).
275. Apa v. Qwest Corp., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1250 (D. Colo. 2005) (applying
Colorado law); In re X.Y., 529 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Minn. 1995); Averill v. Cox, 761 A.2d
1083, 1092 (N.H. 2000); Conn. Eth. Op. 00-3, 2000 WL 1370746, at *2 (Conn. Bar Ass'n
Feb. 1, 2000).
276. See Qualitative Fin. Strategies, Inc. v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP, 55 Pa.
D. & C.4th, 2002 WL 434380, at *5-8 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 12, 2002); N.Y. Eth. Op. 780,
2004 WL 3021155, at *2 (N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Prof'I Ethics Dec. 8, 2004).
277. See, e.g., Potts v. State, 869 So. 2d 1223, 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (permitting lawyer to charge client to copy file except for documents prepared at public expense
or furnished by the client); Moore, 876 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (holding that "[p]ayment of the
reasonable cost of copying the file could be charged to the client as a condition of a release
of the client's file to incoming counsel" where lawyer had recordkeeping obligations under
state law); Mich. Eth. Op. R-019, 2000 WL 33716931, at *4 (St. Bar of Mich., Standing
Comm. on Prof I & Judicial Ethics Aug. 4, 2000) ("The client's right [to its file] is, in gen-
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such copies unless they clearly provide for that expense in their engagement
agreements. 278 An engagement provision stating that a client will be
charged for copies made as part of a representation will not permit a lawyer
to charge a client for copies of file documents upon termination of a repre279
sentation; those are different agreements or
Any copying
280 obligations.
reasonable.
be
must
costs charged to a client
Copying aside, lawyers may charge clients or former clients to assemble, retrieve or deliver files. 281 Again, associated charges must be reasonable. A lawyer cannot, for example, charge a former client to assemble a
file for transfer if the lawyer already charged for file assembly during the
representation.2 82 Furthermore, because a client understandably expects a
lawyer's files to be reasonably well-organized during the course of a normal representation, a lawyer should not charge a client for fundamental
283
filing or organizational tasks when returning or transferring a file.
E.

ELECTRONIC FILES OR RECORDS

Today, much information created in law firms and produced by clients
is generated and stored electronically. It is therefore to be expected that
electronic records requests and disputes will become a regular feature on
the client-file landscape. An increasingly common issue is whether a law
firm must provide a former client or departing lawyer with electronic copies
eral, one of access, not custody or possession. Thus, it is properly the client who should bear
the cost of copying and delivering copies of the file records.").
278.
See Adams v. Putnam County, 658 S.E.2d 805, 806-07 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)
(noting the absence of such an agreement in holding that lawyer could not charge client for
copies of file documents); In re X.Y., 529 N.W.2d at 690 (suggesting that lawyers can provide for such costs in engagement agreements); Averill, 761 A.2d at 1084, 1092 (stating
requirement for clear indication of post-representation copy cost provision in fee agreements).
279.
Adams, 658 S.E.2d at 806-07.
280.
See, e.g., Apa, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 1250-51 (rejecting copying charge of $0.37
per page as unreasonable and reducing it to $0.25 per page); Moore, 876 N.Y.S.2d at 838
(questioning $0.75 per page copying charge and setting hearing to determine reasonableness).
281.
Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn L.L.P., 689 N.E.2d
879, 883 (N.Y. 1997); Or. St. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. No. 2005-125, at 334 (2005).
282.
See Sage Realty, 689 N.E.2d at 883 (concluding that as a general rule, "unless a
law firm has already been paid for assemblage and delivery of documents to the client, performing that function is properly chargeable to the client under customary fee schedules of
the firm, or pursuant to the terms of any governing retainer agreement").
283.
La. St. Bar Ass'n, Rules of Prof'l Conduct Comm., Pub. Op. 05-RPCC-003, at 6
(2005) ("If it is reasonable for the client to expect the files to be relatively organized based
upon the fees paid prior to termination, it would be unreasonable to charge additional fees
for any time required to organize the files to that level-i.e., to do what the lawyer has presumably already been paid to do.").
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of documents where paper copies of the documents have been furnished to
the client or successor counsel, or to a departing lawyer. From a firm's
standpoint, producing materials in electronic form in these circumstances is
inconvenient, redundant, and unnecessary. In some cases it may be expensive in terms of lawyer or staff time dedicated to the task. A firm may not
want to confer advantages on competing lawyers by furnishing documents
in a format that allows them to be easily cut-and-pasted into others. For
clients and departing lawyers, on the other hand, electronic files have many
advantages, ranging from the ability to search the documents to ease and
cost of retrieval and storage of the documents. Electronic documents can be
easily altered or copied for other uses-the ability to cut-and-paste is desirable on this end-and they may contain metadata to which a client or departing lawyer wants access. In any event, state ethics committees that have
considered these issues have so far favored clients and departing lawyers in
electronic records requests.
In a 2007 opinion, the State Bar of California Standing Committee on
Professional Responsibility and Conduct addressed a lawyer's obligation to
provide electronic files to a client for use by successor counsel in litigation
and transactional matters. 284 The client replaced Attorney A with Attorney B
in the underlying matters. Then, as the committee explained:
Client has requested Attorney A to release to Client all of
Client's papers and property. . . . Client has requested an
electronic version of the pleadings ... expressing an intent
to make them available to Attorney B for reuse, by electronic "cutting" and "pasting," in drafting new documents
in the litigation as it progresses, and an electronic version
of the discovery requests and responses, expressing the
same intent. Client has also requested the electronic deposition and exhibit database, expressing an intent to make it
available to Attorney B for use in discovery, trial preparation, and trial itself. Client has additionally requested an
electronic version of the transactional documents in the
[transactional] matter, expressing an intent to make them
available to Attorney B to safeguard Client's interests as
questions or disputes arise .... As to each representation,
Client has requested an electronic version of the e-mail correspondence, for ease of searching its contents.285

284.
St. Bar of Cal., Standing Comm. on Prof'l Resp. & Conduct, Formal Op. No.
2007-174, 2007 WL 2461914 (2007).
285. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
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Attorney A refused to provide the electronic documents on the basis that
286
they contained metadata reflecting other clients' confidential information.
Under California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-700(D), a lawyer
whose employment is terminated must promptly release to the client upon
request all of the client's papers and property.287 The information requested
by the client here clearly fell within the materials covered by Rule 3700(D). The fact that the documents were sought in electronic form was
immaterial.288 The client was presumptively entitled to all of the materials
requested.289 With respect to Attorney A's claim, that he could not provide
the materials because they contained metadata, the committee concluded
that he would have to take "reasonable steps to strip any metadata reflecting
confidential information belonging to other clients from any of the electronic items" before furnishing them to the client.290
In 2006, the New Hampshire Bar Association Ethics Committee was
presented with this question: "Does a law firm have the obligation to relinquish all electronic communications and electronic documents maintained
in the firm's computer network concerning its representation of former clients to an attorney who has left the firm and who will continue to represent
the clients in a different law firm?"'29' The answer to that question was unequivocally "yes," even if the client's request burdened the firm.292 As the
committee saw matters, any "burden [could] be managed, in any event,
through computer word search functions or other means that are routinely
used for discovery or other purposes. 293
In 2001, the Illinois State Bar Association Committee on Professional
Conduct opined that a law firm was required to download a departing lawyer's client files onto disks.294 The committee considered the departing
lawyer's request that the files be loaded onto disks to be reasonable and
noted that the affected clients were entitled to receive their files in the format in which the firm maintained them. 295 In holding as it did, the committee noted that the law firm could easily download the requested files and
any burden associated with that task was minimal when compared with the
prospect of the departing lawyer having to review the hard copies of the
286.
Id.
287.
Id. (quoting CAL. R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3-700(D) (2005)).
288.
Id. at *4.
289.
St. Bar of Cal., Standing Comm. on Prof'l Resp. & Conduct, Formal Op. No.
2007-174, 2007 WL 2461914, at *5 (2007).
290.
Id.
291.
N.H. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm. Op. 2005-06/3, at 1 (Jan. 2006).
292.
Id. at 2.
293.
Id.
294.
I11.Jud. Eth. Op. 01-01, 2001 WL 809802, at *3 (I11.St. Bar Ass'n July 2001).
295.
Id.
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files to determine what documents might be missing.29 6 In the unlikely
event that there was any expense associated
with the downloading, the firm
2 97
was entitled to recoup its reasonable costs.
The majority rule that clients are presumptively entitled to their entire
files should apply to electronic files just as it does to traditional media.298
There is no reason, for example, to distinguish between e-mails and letters;
clients are just as entitled to copies of the former as they are the latter. If
requests for electronic materials by clients or departing lawyers are excessively burdensome or otherwise unreasonable, it is up to firms to explain to
courts their inability to satisfy them, or to justify the client or lawyer bearing the expense of any exceptional undertaking in retrieving, sorting or
transmitting the materials. If producing a client's file in electronic form will
be a significant expense, the firm should inform the client of this fact so
that the client can decide whether the expense is worth incurring. 299 If a
firm must employ a vendor to retrieve electronic documents for a client, for
example, it is generally reasonable for the client to bear the associated expense. 3° It seems likely, however, that in some instances it will be easier
and cheaper for law firms to provide electronic copies of files rather than
paper ones. As with hard copies of files, law firms and clients presumably
can agree contractually on the manner or cost of transferring or retrieving
electronic information, and the nature or scope of the firm's obligation.
Generally speaking, lawyers who provide clients with files in electronic
form must do so in a manner that will allow the clients to retrieve the information using common and reasonably-priced hardware and software.30 '
Of course, even entire file jurisdictions recognize an exception for
purely internal law firm documents, and that same exception logically applies to digital information. Thus, and by way of example, clients are not
presumptively entitled to copies of "e-mail communications between lawyers of the same law firm that are 'intended for internal law office review
and use' and are 'unlikely30 2to be of any significant usefulness to the client or
to a successor attorney."'
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See St. Bar of Cal., Standing Comm. on Prof I Resp. & Conduct, Formal Op.
No. 2007-174, 2007 WL 2461914, at *4 (2007) (calling the form of a client's file "immaterial").
299.
Pa. Eth. Op. 2007-100, 2007 WL 1170779, at *4 (Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Legal Ethics & Prof'l Resp. 2007).
300.
N.Y. City Eth. Op. 2008-1, 2008 WL 3911383, at *5 (Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of N.Y., Comm. on Prof I & Jud. Ethics July 2008).
301.
Supreme Court of Mo., Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 127, at 1 (2009).
302.
N.Y. City Eth. Op. 2008-1, 2008 WL 3911383, at *5 (Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of N.Y., Comm. on Prof'l & Jud. Ethics July 2008) (quoting Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn L.L.P., 689 N.E.2d 879, 883 (N.Y. 1997)).
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V.

CONCLUSION

Lateral movement by lawyers between law firms is now common
among both partners or shareholders and associates. Ours is an age of lawyer mobility. It is also an age of client transience. While clients move from
firm to firm with lateral lawyers who serve them, they also shift relationships on their own. Understandably, lawyer and client mobility have given
rise to questions about possible law firm property rights. Among other
things, law firms may perceive needs to protect their client lists and data
compilations as trade secrets, or seek to shield them from competitors by
enforcing departing lawyers' fiduciary duties. In addition to client lists and
data, law firms commonly maintain other documents and information that
they consider to be their intellectual capital or intellectual property. All
such materials, no matter where maintained and regardless of practice area,
are valuable resources for lawyers undertaking new assignments or representations. Accordingly, firms may want to prevent their transfer to competing law firms via departing lawyers. Finally, there is the common and often
annoying issue of former clients' access to materials in their files.
None of these issues are exotic or exciting. Law firms' protection of
their intellectual capital or property is, however, a critically important concern in today's environment. Prudent firms will address these issues in
manners compatible with their cultures. Less attentive firms that fail to plan
or conduct their affairs proactively risk unnecessary, expensive and disadvantageous controversies.

